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of New York found both subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA
and personal jurisdiction over Talisman as a foreign corporation doing
business in New York. 116 Reaffirming United States and international
treaty precedent, the Court determined that Talisman could be treated as
a state actor under the ATCA. 117 The Court expanded subject matter
jurisdiction under the ATCA by finding that Talisman's cooperation
with the Sudanese government and Talisman's role as a co-conspirator
in the genocidal acts committed by the Sudanese government against
the southern Sudanese populations around oil concessions amounted to
acts under color of state law for purposes of liability under the
ATCA.11s
Rohit Pun}
V. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

Films By Jove, Inc. v. Berov
A. Introduction

In Films By Jove, Inc. v. Berov, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York recognized the sovereignty and
independence of the United States judiciary in the international arena. 119
In its decision, the Court acknowledged the pervasive corruption in the
Russian legal system and revealed an interest in protecting United
States business interests. 120 In disregarding the decision of the High
Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation, Russia's court of last resort,
the Court discounted international principles of comity .121 In doing so,
the Court conveyed intolerance for corruption. 122 Future opinions will
therefore rely on this decision in order to promote United States
interests in the international realm and to justify non-recognition of
foreign judgments.

116. Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp.2d at 319, 331.
117. See id. at 308-17, 328-29.
118. Id. at 328.
119. Films By Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 250 F. Supp.2d 156,
2003)[hereinafter Films By Jove].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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B. Background and Summary ofArguments
In an August 2001 ruling, the Court awarded summary judgment in
favor of an American film company, Films By Jove [hereinafter FBJ],
effectively validating FBJ' s title to over 1,500 Russian animated films
created by a state-owned enterprise prior to 1991. 123 On appeal, Joseph
Berov, an American vendor of the films in question and a defendant in
this action, conceded to violations of copyright law; however, Berov
maintained that FBJ was not the proper plaintiff in the action against
him. 124 Specifically, Berov alleged that the Court should reconsider its
previous grant of summary judgment because of a recent decision by the
High Arbitrazh Court in Russia [hereinafter Arbitrazh], which credited
ownership of the copyrights to a third party plaintiff, the Federal State
Unitarian Enterprise Soyuzmultfilm Studio [hereinafter FSUESMS]. 125
In the instant decision, the Court agreed with FBJ and reaffirmed
FBJ' s position as the valid titleholder of the copyrights in dispute. 126
During the trial, the parties offered fundamentally different versions and
interpretations of the events leading up to the lawsuit. 127 Although the
case involved copyright infringement, the determination of the proper
owner of the copyrights at issue controlled the outcome of the case. 12
FBJ argued that it held a valid title to the copyrights. FBJ alleged
that, in 1989, the Russian state enterprise that had been controlling the
studio since 1936 was transformed into a lease entity, conferring a new
legal status upon it and transferring the ownership of the copyrights. 129
These events occurred during the period of Perestroika, where the
Russian government encouraged privatization and liberalization of the
economy. 130 When the state enterprise was transformed into a lease
entity, FBJ maintained the state enterprise ceased to exist. 131
Accordingly, the copyrights in the films passed to the lease entity,
In 1989,
called Soyuzmultfilm Studio, by operation of law. 132
Soyuzmultfilm Studio agreed to pay rent to the Russian state in
exchange for a ten-year lease on the tangible property owned by the

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 158.
Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 178, 164.
Id.at217.
Id. at 161.
Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 160.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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state. 133 In 1992, Soyuzmultfilm Studio awarded FBJ an exclusive
license to refurbish and sell the copyrighted films. 134 In 1999, just
before the ten-year lease expired, Soyuzmultfilm Studio was
reorganized into a ~rivate company, also called Soyuzmultfilm Studio
[hereinafter SMS]. 1 5 Upon termination of the lease, the state property
that had been leased to Soyuzmultfilm Studio was returned to the state,
and SMS, the privatized company, moved to another location but
retained the copyrights that had passed to it as a result of the
reorganization. 136 Durinf that same year, Russia established a new state
enterprise: FSUESMS. 13
Berov, on the other hand, argued that FSUESMS was the successor
to the original state enterprise and the lawful holder of the copyrights. 138
He argued that the copyrights to the films were owned by the state and
never legally passed to Soyuzmultfilm Studio; rather, the copyrights
"were merely under the 'operative management' of the studio." 139
Accordingly, the Soyuzmultfilm Studio could not have conveyed the
copyrights to FBJ because it never had the authority to do so. 140 Berov
also denied FBJ' s allegation that the state enterprise ceased to exist,
arguing instead that the state enterprise experienced a phase of
"suspended animation" during the ten-year lease and was subsequently
revived as FSUESMS in 1999 .141 Therefore, Soyuzmultfilm Studio
could not have legally sold the copyrights to FBJ; instead, the rights
passed from the original state enterprise to FSUESMS. 142
C. Discussion

The Court reaffirmed its previous grant of summary judgment,
focusing on the flawed logic of the Arbitrazh's decision and the
allegations of corrupt influence by Russian government upon the
Russian judiciary.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 161.
Id. at 160, 162.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 164.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163-64.
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Logic of the Russian Court's Decision
The Court decided that the Russian decision was relevant to the
outcome of Berov's motion for reconsideration because that outcome
would be dependent upon an issue addressed by the Russian court: the
legal succession of the ownership of the copyrights. 143 Although the
Court ultimately rejected the logic of the Arbitrazh's decision, the locus
of the litigation in Arbitrazh pivoted on questions of legal ownership
necessary for the resolution of this case. 144
At the hearing, Berov and FBJ each interpreted the significance of
the Arbitrazh's decision differently. 145
Berov argued that the
Arbitrazh' s conclusion that the state enterprise continued to exist
throughout the ten-year lease period negated FBJ's ownership in the
copyrights. 146 Because the state enterprise retained the copyrights when
the lease agreement was executed in 1989, the copyrights never passed
by operation of law to FBJ. 147 Berov further argued that according to
the Arbitrazh, FSUESMS, as the legal successor to the state enterprise,
owned the disputed rights. 148 FBJ responded by claiming that the
transfer to FSUESMS applied only to the tangible property mentioned
in the lease agreement. 149 FBJ argued that the state enterprise could not
have existed because it lost all the qualities of a commercial entity. 150
The state enterprise during the 1990s had no equipment or office space
and did not function as an independent commercial enterprise. 151
Therefore, FBJ asserted, the state enterprise did not exist during the
lease agreement and the copyrights could not have legally passed to
FSUESMS. 152
In support of his argument, Berov pointed to an information letter
issued by the Arbitrazh that rejected the possibility of automatic legal
succession to SMS by stating that "legal succession is determined by the
content of the property, rights and obligations transferred by the
statement." 153 This argument would be "devastating" to FBJ had the

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d. at 179.
Id. at 158, 179, 216.
Id.
Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 179.
Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 179.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 161.
Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 182-83.
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court not distinguished the situation involved in the information letter
from the one currently in dispute. 154 The reorganization in the
information letter concerned a studio that was "spun off' from an
existing state enterprise. 155 There, the original entity simultaneously
existed alongside the new enterprise. 156 In the current action, the
commercial activity of the state enterprise ceased with the signing of the
lease agreement. 157
The Court found the Arbitrazh's decision inconsistent in several
ways. The lack of activity on the part of the state enterprise suggests
that the state enterprise did, in fact, cease to exist. 158 Moreover, the
Court found FBJ's expert, Dr. Sergei Pashin, convincing.15 9 Dr. Pashin
claimed that the Arbitrazh decision misrepresented the law and
ultimately came to a decision that was "unprecedented and illogical."160
Dr. Pashin further declared that the Arbitrazh decision was an attempt
through collusion to protect state interests, stating that the decision
"allowed the organs of the executive branch to interpret this decision in
any manner they deemed fit, which would be for the purpose of
protecting what is specifically understood to be 'state interest. '" 161 At
the time the lease agreement was executed, the Russian government had
created the Fundamental Principles on Leasing [hereinafter Principles]
to encourage privatization of state industries. 162 According to Dr.
Pashin, the ruling of the Arbitrazh conflicted with the purpose of the
Principles. 163
The Court also found the Arbitrazh decision to be inconsistent
because the record established that the copyrights were never stateowned property. 164 Under Article 486 of the 1964 Soviet Civil Code,
which provides that ownership of copyrights rests with the entity that
created the films, the Soyuzmultfilm Studio clearly owned the
copyrights. 165 Therefore, the Soyuzmultfilm Studio legally owned the

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 183.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 197.
Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 210.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id. at 193, 197, 204.
Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 201.
Id.
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copyrights while the state retained the right to exploit the distribution. 166
However, during Perestroika, the right to distribute the films combined
with the right to hold the copyrights. 167 Since the Soviet state did not
own the copyrights in the first place, the rights could not have been
involved in the 1989 lease agreement because the copyrights remained
with the studio that produced the films rather than the state. 168
According to the Court, the fatal ·flaw in the Arbitrazh' s decision
arose from the implication that the copyrights remained with the state
after the state-owned entity ceased to exist. 169 If the Court adopted the
Arbitrazh' s reasoning, there would have been no entity authorized to
grant the copyrights· during the lease-agreement ·period. 170 If the state
enterprise was in "suspended animation," and the lease enterprise did
not have the rights to the copyrights, then at no point during the ten-year
lease would there have been an entity legally authorized to distribute the
copyrights. 171

Judicial Misconduct
Central to FBJ' s argument is the allegation of insidious corruption
in the Russian judiciary system. 172 Specifically, FBJ accused the state
of exerting "improper governmental influence" over the Russian
courts. 173 The decision was depicted as an attempt to protect Russian
state interests to the detriment of the American company. 174 FBJ' s
expert, Dr. Pashin, gave a convincing description of the state of the
Russian judiciary, revealing that the composition of the Arbitrazh
consists mostly of fonner state employees specifically hired to protect
state interests. 175 Additionally, the Arbitrazh courts lack adequate
funding and are dependent upon the state for resources. 176 This
facilitates a relationship in which the judiciary is unduly influenced by
pro-state concerns. 177
The courts of the United States, interested in protecting citizens

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 201.
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 181, 204.
Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 205.
Id.
Id. at 205-06.
Id. at 206.
Id.
Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 206.
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and companies of the United States, can reject foreign judgments when
evidence exists that the judgment was influenced by corrupt forces. 178
Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
supports this conclusion by stipulating that if a foreign court fails to be
fair or impartial, the United States court is not bound to follow it. 179
Here, FBJ produced evidence of impropriety on the part of the Russian
courts. Several documents detailed a meeting between the deputy
chairman of the Russian Federation and a representative from the
Arbitrazh where the litigation between SMS and FSUESMS, as well as
the need to protect state interests, were addressed. 180 The documents
demonstrated improper influence and justified the United States court's
decision not to defer to the Russian judgment.

F. Holding of the Court
The Court denied Berov's motion for reconsideration, basing its
determination on the flawed logic of the court and viable allegations of
judicial misconduct. 181

G. Conclusion
In declining to defer to the Arbitrazh' s decision and
acknowledging the political corruption of the Arbitrazh, the Court
highlighted the paramount importance of United States business
interests and the judiciary's protectionist role in international law. In
addition, by refusing to defer to the Russian decision, the Court made a
political point and demonstrated its intolerance for judicial corruption.

P. Carey Kulp
VI. NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT

United States ofAmerica v. Schultz
A. Introduction
In United States of America v. Schultz, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit examined whether conspiring to take

178.
179.
(1987)).
180.
181.

Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 207.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b
Id. at 208.
Id. at 216.
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